A Demarcation Full of Tension

4.1.1 Conformity to rules (a)

Overall, we assess that the Police Committee was created as a reactive response to an increase in joint operations, but appears to have been a proactive decision in preparation for the need to encode rules for cooperation in potential emergencies and crises. In short, this initiative reflects a shared desire for a higher degree of legality for a practice that had already taken place. It is also our assessment that none of the parties found it acceptable or relevant to involve the military in political protests. In their own words, the committee created new terminology for military assistance, which was categorized as either “ordinary” or “special assistance” (Surname et al.).

The first category was ordinary because of a long tradition of the military helping the police to some extent with equipment and/or personnel that the police did not have at their organizational disposal, such as aircraft and waterborne vessels. Ordinary assistance was differentiated from special assistance based on whether an operation entailed a risk of confrontation between military personnel and civilians. In other words, within the special assistance regime, soldiers could be granted police legal competence to use force against civilians (FMN, 1973, May 8, box 431). The provision of legal specifications increased the legality of the power conveyed, even though the rules were in many ways unclear at an administrative level and were not passed into law by the parliament. In fact, the rules were not even disclosed to the members of parliament. However, the new terminology was a specification of the prevailing tradition and the 1948 directive, which emphasized that the military could and would only engage in internal disturbances as a matter of last resort (PMF/Politimesterforeningen [The Police Chief Association], 1948; FMN, 1973, May 8, box 431).

The Danish police formed their own SWAT team [Aktionsgrupperne] in 1973 after bearing witness to the terror attack at the Olympics in West Germany the previous year. The creation of the Danish SWAT team was inspired by both a police and a military example: the British Army’s SAS and the German Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG9), a tactical unit of the West German Federal Police also established in reaction to the Munich Massacre (Brinch & Mønster-Kjær, 2005). A journal article argues that the Danish SWAT team was closely linked from the beginning to the two highly specialized military navy and army SOF units from the Danish armed forces¹ (Pedersen 2007, pp. 79–80).

4.1.2 Justifiability in terms of shared beliefs (b)

The special assistance regime lacked justifiability in terms of shared beliefs during the period analyzed. There was a generalized and strong public aversion to military involvement in domestic affairs, and, a leading Danish scholar on police history argues, the subject was highly politically sensitive (Stevnsborg, 2016, p. 261). Left-wing political parties, particularly communists, feared being targeted because of their political views. On numerous occasions, for example in tabloid newspapers and memoirs, they criticized the secrecy surrounding the police-military cooperation agreement, speculating about the potential tasks in which the military could assist the police during peacetime, and suggested that the existence of the directives could foreshadow a totalitarian police state (Buchard, 1979; Wilhjelm, 2005).

Although the public acknowledged the existence of international terrorism and the need for security measures and counterterrorism, at the same time it did not seem to take the threat seriously. The SWAT team itself was alternately either ridiculed or discussed with great democratic concern by both left-wing politicians and the press in newspaper articles (e.g., Buchard, 1979; Schulsinger, 1980). An important reason for both the ridicule and concern surrounding the police’s militarization, including its cooperation with the military, was that the public largely interpreted the development as politicization and exaggeration of security threats.

The minutes of the negotiations in the Danish parliament shows how the public fear of terrorism manifested as a concern with the balance between security and liberty (e.g., FT, 1972, Oct. 4, col. 86–88). MP Strange, for instance, stated that the police and the government “justified” an increased militarization of the police based on allegations of increased violence and terrorism to repress the working class (FT, 1979, April 26, col. 9978; see also Schulsinger, 1980). Even one of the center parties was of the opinion that the police-military cooperation agreement indicated a disturbing and unnecessary escalation that would only lead to further violence (FT, 1979, April 26, col. 9988–89).

4.1.3 Legitimation through expressed consent (c)

In terms of legitimation through expressed consent, it is apparent that the secrecy surrounding the legal specifications concerning police-military cooperation weighs heavily on the delegitimation scale. Going through parliamentary debates from 1972–1980, we find that different Ministers of Justice were asked to explain the government’s initiatives to prevent terrorism due to the increase in hijackings and kidnappings in Europe. No one disclosed the fact that the military could assist the police in these cases.

Even when the National Chief of the Danish Police admitted in a newspaper article that the SWAT team could draw on the military in “extreme situations,” the Defence Command quickly put a lid on it (Boserup, 1977). In the same article, it was wrongly stated that the agreement only involved manned guarding: “[a]rmed actions that may fall within the scope of the police are solved by police officers, and only police officers” (Boserup, 1977). The fact that the Defence Command found it necessary to frame the cooperation agreement in this way indicates a lack of legitimacy and an awareness of the fact that the rules were difficult to justify in terms of shared beliefs.

4.1.4 Assessment

In principle, it is problematic if the public has no knowledge or insight into the governance of the power relationship between themselves (subordinates) and the dominant. In such cases, subordinates have no opportunity to provide consent or lack thereof. This is of further concern when not even the legislative power – the parliament – can gain access to the description of the rules. The necessity of protecting operational secrets does not serve as an extenuation in this case or period. Rather, the lack of transparency tends to serve as a police-military taboo. Overall, we assess the degree of legitimacy of police-military cooperation in the 1970s to be low.

4.2.1 Conformity to rules (a)

Conformity to rules was questionable during the 1980s. The period was characterized by the lack of basic guidelines for what policymakers wanted counterterrorism to entail, including a precise allocation of responsibilities and competences among the police and military (FKO/Forsvarskommandoen [The Defence Command], May 19 and June 25). The Defence Command, in particular, called for “a decision on the extent to which the military can be deployed in confrontations with civilians” (FKO/PU/Politiudvalget [The Defence Command and the Police Committee]. Mødereferat [minutes] (1969–1993), May 19 and June 25). The demarcation’s undefined nature led to internal disagreements between the police and military. The police pressed for more military involvement in counterterrorism, including training with the SWAT team, whereas the military pulled in the other direction to protect the prevailing arrangement of the Special Operations Forces prioritizing training for war over the fight against terrorism (FKO/PU/Politiudvalget [The Defence Command and the Police Committee]. Mødereferat [minutes] (1969–1993), April 21 and November 8, 1990, June 1).

4.2.2 Justifiability in terms of shared beliefs (b)

As in the previous decade, the special assistance regime lacked justification in terms of shared beliefs. With regard to the use of force against civilians, the dominant parties (police and military) were preoccupied with terrorism, whereas subordinates (the public) were preoccupied with social protests. The 1980s were characterized by a recession, unemployment, labor conflicts, and an escalation of violence between the police and squatter communities (predominantly in Copenhagen), scholars of the era show Heinemann, 1995; Jepsen, 1986; Vestergaard, 1986).

Overall, the press was critical of the police and military (Stevnsborg, 2016, p. 262), depicting the police as violent and claiming at one point that the police had requested military assistance to displace squatters (Information, 1987a, b). The police did make a request for an armored personnel carrier, which the military refused. However, the incident once again led left-wing members of parliament to demand openness about the content of the existing cooperation agreement between the police and the military and a clarification of the division of competencies (FT, 1987, March 16 and 18). The protesters saw the secrecy surrounding the cooperation agreement as an indicator of repression and called for more transparency. The government failed to disclose the rules (FT, 1987, March 24 and 25, col. 9957), adding to its legitimacy deficiency.

4.2.3 Legitimation through expressed consent (c)

The government’s lack of disclosure regarding the nature of police-military cooperation was a persistent issue in the 1980s. It was not the absence of guidelines for such cooperation, but rather the secrecy surrounding them that prompted protests. Members of the parliament posed many questions that were never answered, leaving both parliamentarians and the public with no possibility of expressing consent to the fact that soldiers could legally be deployed against the nation’s own citizens.

4.2.4 Assessment

For the police and military, the 1980s were a process of trial and error to find a legitimate way to cooperate. The period saw substantial criticism toward the police-military nexus being raised by the media and in parliament due to the secrecy surrounding the legal framework of cooperation. In our view, all three components of legitimacy were under pressure in the 1980s; therefore, we assess the degree of legitimacy in this period to be low.

4.3.1 Conformity to rules (a)

In previous decades, the police needed the military, and now, the military needed the police. Furthermore, the Gulf War in 1991 prompted the Defence Intelligence Service to raise the threat level for a terrorist attack in Denmark, making counterterrorism a high priority according to a former commander of the Army Special Forces (Dahl, 2006, p. 85). This was also followed by the sought-after clarification of responsibility and competence within both the police and military in the 1980s, issuing a new regulatory framework to replace the document from the 1970s (FMN, 1991, Oct. 8 and 9, box 223). The new description of rules increased the degree of legitimacy by emphasizing that special assistance could only be provided with permission from the Minister of Defence (FMN, 1991, Oct. 9, box 223).

4.3.2 Justifiability in terms of shared beliefs (b)

After a decade in Danish history characterized by a balance of payments deficit, high unemployment, low growth, a historic record in foreclosures, high interest rates, and expensive mortgages, the 1990s represented an economically optimistic decade. There was, however, persistently strong public and political av

ersion toward the idea

of the military helping the police in situations of social unrest. In order to avoid subsequent political controversy, police leaders were hesitant to admit the use of the SWAT team when clearing houses occupied by squatters (Surname et al.). However, the far left had lost influence, and legal policy took a punitive turn toward law and order and offered more support to the police (Volquartzen, 2013).

The peace dividend also had a direct impact on the studied legitimization process because the Danish Army Special Forces were at risk of being disbanded due to austerity measures. This made the otherwise hermetically closed corps engage with the media, revealing their secrets about assisting the police in the event of terrorism (FAK/Forsvarsakademiet [Royal Danish Defence Academy]; Dahl, 2006, pp. 79–90). This new strategy of transparency was timely and likely helped change the public perception of counterterrorism and the police-military nexus, ultimately leading to greater acceptance. This resulted in the continued existence of the Danish Army Special Forces.

4.3.3 Legitimation through expressed consent (c)

Even though the authorities allowed more transparency on the existing cooperation between the police and military during the 1990s, the scope and range of the special assistance regime were still not made publicly available, preventing people from expressing their potential consent or lack thereof. The increased transparency of the decade was primarily rooted in the Army Special Forces seeking “new opportunities” after the end of the Cold War, resulting in a much more public profile that included the unit’s role in supporting the police with civilian tasks. The commander of the Army Special Forces personally promoted this new approach in newspaper interviews (see Larsen, 1993; Westh, 1993).

4.3.4 Assessment

Clearer regulation, increased transparency on cooperation, and a better clarification of which issues fell within the remits of the police and the military, respectively, all point to a higher degree of legitimacy. However, the lack of consent counterbalances this, thus placing our assessment of legitimacy in the medium category.

4.4.1 Conformity to rules (a)

The political sensitivity and mediatization of the abovementioned events made the military take precautions to secure rule conformity, for example by emphasizing that any direct action, including the use of physical force, in demonstrations or maintaining order, had to be avoided (FMN, 2002, May 23). The police also emphasized that police officers had exclusive authority to engage with activists in regard to the exercise of authority (FMN, 2002, Aug. 27). As Beetham (2013, p. xii) states: “[p]ower is acknowledged as legitimate if it is acquired and exercised in accordance with prevailing rules.” However, it was still extremely uncertain which legal basis should be applied to military personnel in cooperative operations.

4.4.2 Justifiability in terms of shared beliefs (b)

The increased focus on counterterrorism during the 1990s continued into the new millennium. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks (both in Europe and outside its borders) clearly demonstrated how security policy challenges and risks changed in the face of new, asymmetric, and unpredictable threats. This realization was explicitly addressed in the political agreement for the Danish Defence 2005–2009, in which it was also stated that one of the military’s main tasks was to assist in counteracting terrorist acts on Danish territory (see Stevnsborg, 2010, p. 215). The threat of terrorism replaced the threat of war. According to a seminal work on the history of the Danish police it became obvious to policymakers in the first half of the 2000s that it was increasingly difficult to separate external from internal threats (Stevnsborg, 2010, p. 215ff). Terrorism was a crime-war hybrid that served as a justification for closer cooperation between the police and military.

Media and public debates also changed after September 11. By the beginning of 2001, prior to September 11, the press was still questioning and was critical of the secrecy surrounding the special assistance regime (e.g., Dahlin, 2001). Furthermore, the left wing in the parliament continuously called for a clarification of the limits for when the military could be deployed against the civilian population in peacetime, insisting on the necessity of a “razor-sharp” (MP V. Søvndal cited in: FT, 2001, Feb 7, col. 4202) demarcation between police and military competencies. This form of criticism all but vanished after September 11. The press was generally supportive in their coverage of the police SWAT team, such as in 2013, when a special assistance operation co-organized by the team and soldiers from the navy special operations forces shot and killed a drug smuggler (Jensen, 2013, January 7).

The disappearance of public demand for a clear demarcation between said institutions was not necessarily due to a newfound public acceptance of the police-military nexus but rather as a displacement of the object of criticism. The government’s response to the international threat of terrorism fueled the ongoing public debate on securitization that had evolved since the 1970s. In the 1970s, critics were primarily from the far left, and the object of critique was the militarization of the police in order to repress the working class.

By the 2000s, however, the class perspective had ceased to exist in the public debate: the political critique shifted to a civic liberal concern with the state’s (the police’s) increased use of citizen surveillance and the violation of fundamental freedoms through the issuance of extensive legislation that followed a cross-ministerial governmental workgroup report on preparedness against terrorism (Regeringen, 2005; Volquartzen, 2013).

Another explanation for the absence of criticism is that the authorities allowed for more transparency regarding police-military cooperation, and the concept of special assistance became public during this period, for example in the official instructions for incident management (REFIL, 2010). Secrecy and mistrust of the topic had been the focal points of criticism over the years, and the new level of transparency, in all probabilities, had a reductive effect on public skepticism.

4.4.3 Legitimation through expressed consent (c)

Even though the dominant offered the subordinate more insight into the special assistance regime, its scope remained a secret (Stevnsborg, 2018a, 185). Writing as late as 2016, Ashtiani Olsen argues in a journal article based on his master’s thesis that “[p]olice requests for support from the military are primarily based on custom, practice and guidelines, while no legislation exists in the area” (Ashtiani Olsen, 2016, p. 6).

4.4.4 Assessment

As in the previous period, the special assistance regime in the 2000s lacked legitimacy and legality because of its uncertain legal basis and the parliament’s failure to codify the rules. However, we assess the degree of legitimacy as medium because of efforts to exercise power conveyed in conformity with the existing rules, increased transparency on the topic, and greater coherence between the rules and supporting beliefs in society.

4.5.1 Conformity to rules (a)

Part of the planned expansion was “Operation Gefion,” which began in September 2017. The 2015 Copenhagen shooting and the refugee and migrant crisis in the same year gave rise to new police tasks such as the visible protection of high-risk locations in Copenhagen (e.g., the synagogue and embassies) and border control. This put the police in a veritable crisis and rendered the institution unable to fulfill many of its normal tasks. In an attempt to relieve pressure on the police, the government launched Operation Gefion, which allowed soldiers to take over manned guarding (Volquartzen, 2020).

This unprecedented deployment of military personnel required the temporary transfer of limited constabulary powers and was implemented under special assistance regulations – originally issued to regulate rare and short-term occurrences, but now employed as the legal basis for police-military cooperation on a much more permanent basis. Thus, the time was ripe for the codification of cooperation rules. With the issuance of new rules in 2018, the authorities established a comprehensive and detailed legal regulation of military assistance to the police for the first time in Danish legal history (Schack & Uggerhøj-Winther, 2018). The new legislation did not change the basic principles of how the military could assist the police; however, by codifying the rules, lawmakers ensured transparency and legality.

4.5.2 Justifiability in terms of shared beliefs (b)

The shared narrative of the democratic necessity of having a clear demarcation between the police and military, including the illegitimacy of the deployment of armed soldiers in domestic security matters, thrived between 2015–2018. Two examples are the deployment of the Home Guard at the borders in December 2015, although unarmed and strictly to provide assistance to the police (e.g., Brøndum, 2015, December 16), and their involvement in Operation Gefion in 2017, which was covered by both the press and scholars (Frich, 2017; Stevnsborg, 2018b). Another example is the SWAT operation that caused the death of a drug dealer in Copenhagen (DUP, 2016, p. 17). The press revealed that three of the 12 police officers in the special tactical unit were soldiers from the navy special operations forces, which led to a brief parliamentary debate on the purpose of the special assistance regime (e.g., Randeris, 2016; Ritzau, 2017, March 7).

Yet, as in the previous period, we can identify a shift in the content of the public and political opposition. It shifts from being an ideological concern with the very notion of armed soldiers assisting the police to a legal concern with the vague regulations and lack of control mechanisms for special assistance. Overall, police-military cooperation became acceptable during the 2015–2018 period, which was confirmed when the Minister of Justice stated in a newspaper interview that having soldiers in the streets was not a temporary situation but something that Danish citizens should get used to (Nielsen and Domino, 2018, January 23). The spree of Islamist terror attacks served as justification for the militarization of border control, public protection, and crime control in these years.

4.5.3 Legitimation through expressed consent (c)

In spring of 2018, a majority in the Danish parliament publicly decided on a set of radical changes to the special assistance regime with the codification of police-military cooperation into legislation (Schack & Uggerhøj-Winther, 2018). We term these changes “radical” as the new law effectively ended decades of political friction and public criticism of the lack of transparency. This parliamentary procedure is what Beetham would call an important action because it confers legitimacy on the powerful by constituting “public expressions by the subordinate of their consent to the power relationship and their subordinate position within it” (Beetham, 2013, p. 91).

4.5.4 Assessment

The legitimacy of police-military cooperation was challenged in this period, beginning with the police failing to observe the inherent limits of the special assistance regime (e.g., the Defence Command rejecting requests for assistance in spring 2015; see above), thereby losing legitimacy (Beetham, 2013, p. 35). However, the authorities (whether the military, police, or government) ultimately realized that “special” was no longer an appropriate description of the type of assistance, and changed the rules accordingly, with subsequent public acceptance. Overall, we measure the degree of legitimacy of police-military cooperation to be high.