Intimate Partner Violence: Conflicts of Priority in Police Practice

1. Introduction

The overall goal for the Swedish police, ever since New Public Management (NPM) was introduced, has been to increase the clearance rate of crimes (see, e.g., Regeringen, 2006; Regeringen, 2019). Goal achievement has been measured through statistics on reported crimes and cases submitted/referred to prosecutor¹ (see, e.g., Polisen, 2007b, 2020). The police’s official statistics on domestic violence suggest that the goal has not been achieved (Polisen, 2022d). Between 2013 and 2023, the number of submitted/referred cases, also viewed as a measure of clearance rates by the police, concerning domestic assault has decreased by 25 per cent (Polisen, 2024c).

In recent years, two of the Swedish police’s most important goals have been to combat serious crimes, including organised crimes and shootings, as well as crimes against particularly vulnerable victims in close relationships (Polisen, 2019). A mapping made by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet, BRÅ) showed that between 2018 and 2023, the number of employees increased by 2,900 people (36%), but the staff growth was significantly lower at the local level compared to the district and regional levels (Franke Björkman & Fjelkegård, 2024). However, as both organised crimes and intimate partner violence (IPV) are handled at the local police level, the significant increase in staff has not adequately addressed the influx. As a result, most cases of assault within close relationships and that are not classified as serious receive lower priority (Franke Björkman & Fjelkegård, 2024). The study further showed that, while the case inflow for crimes against particularly vulnerable victims remained essentially unchanged between 2018 and 2023, the number of employees in specialised investigative units handling intimate partner violence (IPV) increased by 70 per cent (Franke Björkman & Fjelkegård, 2024). BRÅ thus assessed that the IPV units should have a good capacity to manage the inflow of cases involving particularly vulnerable victims. However, BRÅ could not find any support for an increase in the clearance rates. Furthermore, BRÅ noted that this may partly be due to the fact that the investigative teams for IPV are characterised by high absenteeism, with one-third consisting of staff who have been employed for less than a year, and therefore lack the experience necessary for the operation to function optimally (Franke Björkman & Fjelkegård, 2024).

Police resources are necessary to investigate crime, but the lack of an increase of the clearance rate could also be a natural consequence of non-optimal conditions for investigating non-serious violence (Axnäs, 2024). The problem is that the Swedish police do not regularly follow up on, or quality-assure, closed investigations. Thus, the Swedish police do not know the conditions under which the crime was investigated, nor do they know which investigative measures have been taken, as follow-up on investigative activities focuses on cases submitted to the prosecutor (Axnäs, 2024). An unwilling victim who does not cooperate, and/or a lack of witnesses or other supporting evidence, makes it difficult to disprove self-defence and to prove the intent to “inflict bodily harm, illness, or pain” in accordance with Chapter 3, Section 5 of the Penal Code² (Axnäs, 2024). However, it may also be that the goal (to increase prosecution) and the chosen measurement method (more offenders being convicted) do not address the core issue: that the perpetrator should stop committing violence against their partner.

In light of this, the society in which the police are one actor needs to approach the issue from multiple perspectives rather than simply focusing on the idea that a conviction will stop someone from abusing. The police’s ongoing monitoring of investigative work needs to focus on what is not being done and why, rather than on the number of cases that lead to prosecution. This is particularly important because the number of convictions, especially prison sentences for minor and standard assault, is relatively low, and since the Swedish police must manage daily conflicting demands (Axnäs, 2024).

The core issue in this conflict of objectives is that the Police Act³ states that it is the police’s duty to investigate crimes but on the other hand, they are required to discontinue an investigation “if there is no longer any reason to continue the investigation” (RB 23:4)⁴, or “if further investigation would incur costs that are not proportionate to the importance of the matter, and it can also be assumed that the severity of the crime does not exceed a sentence of three months’ imprisonment” (RB 23:4 a)⁵. That means, if the investigation leader believes that it would be impossible to convict anyone for the crime – even if further investigative measures will be taken – they could and should close the file (Polisen, 2021b). At the same time, it is stated that the police shall ensure an effective capacity to prevent and investigate violence by men against women in intimate relationships (Regeringen, 2024).

This study focuses on “investigability” and the Swedish police’s capability to actually investigate and solve cases of non-aggravated assault – thereby meeting the expectations to combat domestic violence through increased prosecution. The analysis and discussion focus on the conflict of demands that the police face daily.

2. Theoretical framework

The police make daily rational choices based on the information that is possible to collect, which aligns with March’s conception of rational decision theory (March, 1994). At the same time the police organisation can be described as one in which officers use their professional knowledge and discretion daily in their interactions with citizens (Lipsky, 2010). Therefore, rational decision theory (March, 1994) and Lipsky’s theory on how street-level bureaucracies manage and prioritise an ever-increasing flow of cases (Lipsky, 2010) will be used for analysing and addressing whether, why, and how the investigation process differs based on the severity of the crime, the nature of the case, and the characteristics of the parties involved.

A minimum requirement for understanding and analysing organisations is that the organisation’s mission and conditions are clearly defined (Freidson, 1988). In addition, the environment and the rules that the organisation must adhere to must also be identified, especially the profession’s approach to the organisation’s various preferences, which may, to varying degrees, be in direct conflict with one another (Brodkin, 2011; Jönsson, 2021). The duties of the police are specified and regulated by the Police Ordinance (2014:1104)⁷, the Police Act (1984:387)⁸, and the Code of Judicial Procedure (RB)⁹. However, the police also function as a street-level bureaucracy, transforming overarching criminal justice policy goals and ambitions into practical operations (Lipsky, 2010). Conflicts between the legislature’s normative goals and the political objectives of the organisation force or enable the decision maker to choose which preference should be given interpretative preference (Jönsson, 2021). The street-level bureaucrats can be both forced and allowed to prioritise cases to meet the organisation’s preference for “being effective” at the expense of the legislature’s intention that the police’s task is to “investigate crimes”, as the discretion is described by, for example, Lipsky (2010) and Liljegren et al. (2021).

On one hand, according to Lipsky, street-level bureaucracies are characterised by the fact that their officers are at the bottom of the organisational decision hierarchy, but at the same time, due to their profession, they have significant discretion and direct interaction with individuals (victim and offenders) seeking the organisation’s services (Lipsky, 2010). On the other hand, the individual police officer’s room for discretion is limited by laws, regulations, personal values, collegial factors, the actual leader who often lacks “proven experience”, and the organisational context (Jönsson, 2021). It is equally a matter of determining which cases may be deprioritised, with reference to the relevant legal provisions and grounded in rational decision-making (Liljegren et al., 2021). Fundamentally, it is a matter of normatively rule-bound and rational decisions about what the police should and are allowed to do when a crime is reported, as well as the available (rational) choices (Axnäs, 2024). Nonetheless, how individual officers interpret and relate to the rules and policies may vary.

3. Aims

The overall aim is to increase the knowledge about the role of the police in the investigation process for intimate partner violence and whether there are differences in how the police utilise investigative measures when the crime occurs in a close relationship compared with violence between acquaintances or strangers.

Two important questions will be examined and discussed.

4. Method and data

The study employs a mixed-methods approach. The quantitative component involves collecting police reports to identify what investigative measures can initially be taken and which have actually been implemented. To deepen understanding of the investigative process in practice – particularly why certain measures were not undertaken – qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten investigation leaders. These interviews explored the criteria that inform decisions to close an investigation and how various circumstances are assessed. Based on their responses, several factors emerged that the investigators, either partially or unanimously, identified as reasons for terminating an investigation. These factors were also typical of cases that were generally difficult to establish as criminal offences and, consequently, seldom allowed for a reliable prediction of prosecution.

5. Findings

The three study groups – intimate partner violence (IPV), assault against a stranger (S), assault against an acquaintance (A) – have identical clearance rates: about nine per cent was submitted to the prosecutor in all groups. However, the conditions for investigating the crimes and the police efforts or actions taken in the various investigations, differ between the groups. Mostly, this applies when it comes to the victim’s willingness to participate in the investigation. About three-quarters of the IPV victims participated compared with 81 and 95 per cent of the A and S group, respectively. Furthermore, there are significant differences between the group of IPV and strangers regarding witnesses or surveillance cameras: less than half of the IPV cases compared with three-quarters of the S group (Table 3). The results also show that victims of IPV seek medical care for injuries less frequently compared with the A and S groups. This could be explained by the fact that the violence in the IPV cases more seldom results in bleeding lacerations compared to assault between strangers and acquaintances, 13, 29 and 27 per cent, respectively.

Optimal conditions for investigation vary with perpetrator-victim relationships, being lowest in the IPV category and highest for violence between strangers (Table 3). About one-third of the IPV group have at least good conditions to be investigated (investigability 4), since there are witnesses to these crimes on this level. The corresponding proportion for acquaintances is almost half of the cases, and for strangers, two-thirds.

Regarding the perpetrator’s prior criminal activity, the results show that it is significantly less common for the perpetrator to have been convicted of a violent crime in cases of intimate partner violence, but also when the parties are acquaintances, compared with the group of strangers.

The conditions referred to in the previous section are relevant for what investigative measures are chosen. Three key measures can be identified in addition to offering a victim’s counsel. The measures are: 1) to interview all victims that cooperate when the crime is reported, 2) to interview witnesses and/or to collect CCTV footage in cases where there are witnesses/CCTV, and 3) to obtain medical records in cases where the victim has sought or might need medical care (Table 4).

We can observe that the police do take further investigative measures in cases, even when the initial report indicates that there are no witnesses to interview or CCTV cameras to check: in 40 per cent of the cases with an acceptable investigability level, in 20 per cent of the cases with poor (2) investigability, and as much as 33 per cent of the cases with very poor investigability (1).

What can be investigated should be investigated. It is not possible to claim that certain matters should be investigated while others should not. Much depends on what emerges from the report. Are there witnesses, or can the offence be proven by other means? Is it possible to establish intent? As time passes, the investigation becomes more difficult, and cases of common assault often do not receive the highest priority¹⁴.

However, Table 4 also shows that of the investigations with optimal conditions (n=38), the police could have done more in 40 per cent of the cases, but they chose not to do so. Overall, the police could have taken additional actions in 33 per cent (n=94) of all cases. Two investigation leaders explain this in the following way:

I would never proceed with an assault case in a pub, especially if there’s a counter-claim report. Two drunk individuals – it’s not feasible. The prosecutor will likely dismiss it. In that case, I might as well close it immediately to save everyone time¹⁵.

I almost always initiate an investigation if the offence is assault. However, if the situation is chaotic, unclear, or involves a very minor offence, I do not initiate an investigation. The victim must appear credible. It’s quite common for intoxicated individuals to file a report in the heat of the moment, only to later withdraw it or regret their actions¹⁶.

The distribution of investigations where not all possible measures have been taken is presented in Table 5.

As shown in Table 5, it seems that the shortcomings of not implementing expected measures are less common when the violence has occurred in intimate relationships (13%) compared with violence between strangers (41%).

Sometimes I choose not to close the case immediately, so that the victim does not feel dismissed right away, it can be perceived as insensitive […] We must not forget the crime-preventive effect; we apply a significantly lower threshold when it comes to particularly vulnerable victims¹⁷.

However, of the total 94 cases with shortcomings (33%), the victim cooperates in the majority (n=69) of the cases. In the next section these cases are examined for the possible reasons why action was not taken.

One is fairly proactive early on. What does the report indicate? Is there any evidence suggesting that initiating the investigation is unwarranted? If we can quickly determine that this is unlikely to lead to any meaningful results, we should avoid allocating unnecessary resources to it¹⁸.

You know, two intoxicated troublemakers in a bar, that’s a completely different matter. If it involves minor violence and the victim does not wish to seek medical attention, then, well, I sure have a solid basis for not initiating an investigation¹⁹.

We have a clear objective, and that is to keep the balance down. We must be efficient; everyone follows the national investigation strategy. We are to investigate those that lead to prosecution and allocate resources to the right cases²⁰.

In cases where the police, even though the victim cooperated in the entire investigation, did not undertake all the expected investigative actions, only seven per cent lack aggravating circumstances, such as minor or no injuries, arguments, or counter-claim reports (Table 6). While most cases involving IPV include two or more aggravating circumstances, the corresponding proportions for the two other groups are lower.

In 45 cases where the victim cooperated, they were never questioned. Five of these 45 are IPV cases. In one of these five cases, the investigation leader chose not to initiate an investigation as the incident did not constitute a crime. In the second case, the assessment was that there was reason to believe there could potentially be a crime, but it occurred so long ago that the statute of limitations had expired. In the third case, it was evident that the suspect admitted during questioning to having inflicted violence on the victim by pushing her. However, the suspect claimed that he lacked intent and that it was an unfortunate circumstance that she was injured. This case was closed due to lack of evidence. The report indicated that the parties had an argument, and the case included a counter-claim report. Also, the fourth case involved an argument beforehand, and the injury was minor as the suspect had merely held the victim’s arm tightly. The fifth case included a male victim, a female perpetrator, and a counter-claim report. The witness in the case had not been questioned.

If there are witnesses, they should be interviewed. I see no reason not to. Possibly if it becomes clear from the victim’s interview that the listed witness didn’t see anything or is a friend of the victim. But it’s really strange not to do it. I don’t understand.²¹

No, that’s not the case. We do interview witnesses. But if the victim doesn’t want to, intoxication level shouldn’t matter, but I know it does. If there’s no note about witnesses in the report, I assume there aren’t any. I can’t read the whole investigation and all the interviews before making a decision. There’s simply no time.²²

Most of the witnesses in the IPV cases were interviewed. Five per cent of the witnesses were not interviewed even if the victim was willing to cooperate. In contrast, for the other two groups, it is a more common “measure not taken”, accounting for 26 per cent and 20 per cent of cases where the victim cooperated.

There is one type of case where I always initiate an investigation: when the crime has occurred within an intimate relationship. In such instances, it is crucial to investigate, as the report may be just the tip of the iceberg²³.

Finally, there is one investigative measure that shall be taken when an investigation regarding assault has been initiated: a victim’s counsel shall be offered to the victim, regardless of the relation between the two parties.²⁴ From Table 7, it appears that the police do not comply with the law in this regard.

If there is no supporting evidence at all, then I do not initiate an investigation. You cannot press charges based on one person’s word against another’s. There must be something that supports the victim’s account. Then there is no reason to offer a victim’s counsel either.²⁵

Less than half (43%) of the IPV group was offered a victim’s counsel. Of them, a majority did not accept this offer, while about 18 per cent accepted. Even if these rates are low, they are significantly higher than the cases that included strangers and acquaintances. Of the 24 victims who were offered a victim’s counsel, less than half continued during the full investigation without dropping out. Within the group of IPV victims who accepted a victim’s counsel, the clearance rate was 21 per cent. Within the group who accepted, and did not drop out, the clearance rate was 50 per cent.

Of 230 suspects with a Swedish identification number, the proportion of initiated investigations was about the same among those who were known for previous violent behaviour compared with those who were not (92% and96%), respectively. At the same time, the clearance rate in the group of recidivists is three times higher. A total of 62 of the identified suspected perpetrators have a prior violent record. In the group of IPV there were two cases where an investigation was not initiated, even though the perpetrator was known as violent. In the group of acquaintances there were three and in the group of strangers there were none.

Table 8 shows that significantly more victims of IPV drop out during the investigation process compared with those that involved strangers or acquaintances. The proportion of those unwilling to participate was 26 per cent in the initial phase of the investigation but increased to 53 per cent during the process. It was more common for witnesses or surveillance footage to provide evidence of the victim’s account in cases where the parties were strangers than among acquaintances or in an intimate relationship. However, it was more common for the perpetrator to confess when the violent crime occurred in a close relationship. Finally, it is noteworthy that in 18 per cent of the cases there was evidence that supported the victim’s story, and the victim cooperated throughout the process. Yet only nine per cent was reported to the prosecutor. However, it seems like this shortcoming is less common among IPV and cases that involved acquaintances (13% and 10%, respectively) compared with the group of strangers (26%).

6. Discussion

This study has shown that there are important differences in investigability between investigations of assault in IPV and assaults in other contexts. IPV investigations more often involve minor injuries, verbal altercations, and counter-reports. These cases also more frequently lack witnesses, and IPV victims are less likely to cooperate with the police. These aggravating circumstances pose several challenges for the investigation leader. In the following section, we discuss how these differences in investigability may influence police decision-making during the investigation process and how the police may navigate conflicts in prioritisation.

The discussion in this study can advantageously be applied to a modified version (see Figure 1) of the investigative process model previously published by Axnäs (2024).

Figure 1.

Verbal altercations, in combination with counter-reports and less severe injuries, are circumstances which, according to the interviewed investigation leaders, often indicate that prosecution is unlikely. If the prognosis for prosecution is not positive, the investigation is typically discontinued on the grounds that the offence cannot be substantiated (Polisen, 2021b). Nonetheless, a certain number of IPV cases are still forwarded to the prosecutor, which is somewhat unexpected. This may be due to the police – driven by organisational goals, albeit in tension with operational strategy – continuing to prioritise and address violence within close relationships, even when such violence is less severe and more challenging to investigate. Victims of IPV are offered a victim’s counsel more frequently than victims in other categories. However – and this is notably surprising – if the victim is unwilling to cooperate, a victim’s counsel is less often provided. This may suggest that street-level bureaucrats prioritise vulnerable victims as long as the victim acknowledges their vulnerability and actively accepts help from the police.

If the victim does not cooperate during the initial interview, no formal statement is obtained, making other initial investigative measures more difficult to carry out. These include, for example: identifying potential witnesses, securing the crime scene for traces or evidence, conducting a search of the victim’s residence, arresting the suspect (often based on the victim’s statement), documenting injuries through photographs or video, and obtaining medical or forensic certificates. In the present study, crime scene investigations by forensic experts were not even included as a variable – simply because such measures were almost never undertaken. One reason for this is that minor injuries typically do not leave blood traces or visible evidence in the same way as more serious injuries. Furthermore, this study didn’t involve variables about why victims don’t want to cooperate or how the police handle them, how often, or in what ways the non-cooperating victims had been contacted, nor what arguments were used to encourage their cooperation.

Interviews with police investigation leaders confirm that, in assault investigations, interviewing the victim is the most fundamental investigative measure available. As the most common and critical source of information (Polisen, 2023b), the victim interview often forms the foundation of the investigation. This is where police officers can play a significant role by collecting relevant details from the victim’s statement – details that can, in turn, lead to additional measures such as involving forensic experts. Despite this, the results of the study show that interviews with IPV victims are not always conducted.

Given the variation in case characteristics, the decision-making process of the police may be considered relatively rational – particularly when necessary information cannot easily be obtained, leaving the evidentiary basis too weak to proceed. It can be assumed that investigation leaders act rationally under these conditions. If a victim refuses to cooperate, the prosecutor typically lacks a case. However, in situations where other forms of evidence may support the victim’s initial account – despite the victim’s later refusal to cooperate – the investigative leader must weigh the victim’s reluctance against the police’s legal duty to investigate, while also considering operational efficiency and the likelihood of a successful prosecution. As one investigation leader expressed, the conflicting goals of investigating fewer cases while simultaneously increasing the clearance rate are difficult to manage:

They only inform you about what to prioritise but not what to deprioritise. If you prioritise some cases, others must be set aside, but no guidance is provided. We can no longer examine every avenue, not even for vulnerable victims like those experiencing IPV²⁷.

According to the government’s appropriation directive (Regeringen, 2024) and the police strategic operational plan (Polisen, 2024b), law enforcement is expected to demonstrate a strong ability to prevent and investigate male violence against women, and to ensure that investigative practices are fair, efficient, and consistent. At the same time, the police function as a street-level bureaucracy – a type of organisation that must develop internal strategies to manage and ration the inflow of cases, as demand for services often exceeds available resources. While laws and regulations limit discretion, they also create opportunities (Jönsson, 2021). Discretion may operate in both directions. On the one hand, an investigator may argue – based on prior experience – that a victim who refuses to cooperate rarely changes their stance, and that prosecutors are unlikely to pursue charges without the victim’s participation. In such cases, rationing investigative resources becomes not only a pragmatic choice, but an organisational imperative. Time spent on cases unlikely to lead to prosecution is time lost on cases with more promising outcomes. On the other hand, such assumptions may be based on outdated data and working methods. If the police manage to convince more victims to cooperate, the number of successful prosecutions may increase, and the investigation leaders’ experiences – and expectations – might shift accordingly.

Victims who do not participate pose a well-documented challenge for the criminal justice system (Davis, 1983). Still, what is actually said during interviews aimed at persuading victims to cooperate appears to be of critical importance. It is reasonable to assume that these conversations vary depending on whether the investigator is motivated by procedural efficiency (e.g., closing a case quickly) or by a broader goal, such as reducing violence against women or encouraging perpetrators to cease using violence.

One investigation leader described this dilemma clearly:

It’s much easier to initiate an investigation and then close it citing a non-cooperative victim than to assign the case to an already-stressed investigator, asking them to influence the victim when experience shows that it probably won’t lead anywhere²⁸.

In such instances, the judgement of the investigation leader is that the case is unlikely to result in a conviction. However, if there is supporting evidence for the victim’s statement, it could be argued that assigning a victim’s counsel might help reduce the victim’s reluctance. Yet, this study also shows that even cooperative victims are not always offered a victim’s counsel. This may suggest that police responses are not only guided by procedural rules but are also shaped by their assessment of the victim’s perceived vulnerability and willingness to engage. Research indicates that many women report domestic violence not primarily to ensure a conviction, but to assert that the violence is unacceptable and to stop the immediate threat (Belfrage & Strand, 2012; Marklund & Nilsson, 2008; Nilsson, 2002; Scheffer Lindgren, 2009). This highlights the need for a broader understanding of victims’ motivations and expectations when interacting with the police.

It is important to recognise that the investigative process is not static, but a dynamic sequence of actions and decisions. At the initial stage, in cases when the violence is not severe, the police may choose to place less emphasis on achieving prosecution and instead focus on preventive efforts – such as outreach and persuasive conversations aimed at encouraging victim cooperation. For example, in one Local Police District (LPO) in Stockholm, officers have begun applying such preventive strategies in practice. These efforts align with findings from Petersen et al. (2022), who conducted a meta-analysis of various preventive interventions. Their analysis suggests that so-called second-responder programmes appear promising in theory, but have limited impact in actually reducing repeat incidents of domestic violence (Petersen et al., 2022). While this may be seen as a positive outcome – suggesting improved access to support services – the overall conclusion is that second-responder programmes require further research. More established and evidence-based methods may be more effective in preventing intimate partner violence (Petersen et al., 2022).

Since legislative reforms in 1982 (Regeringen, 1981), domestic violence has been recognised in Sweden as a societal issue warranting state intervention, rather than a private family matter. Against this backdrop, there is a strong case for considering new legislative or procedural reforms. Notably, after the data collection for this study, several important changes occurred. As of 2022, national guidelines permit frontline officers to use body-worn cameras (Polisen, 2022c), which can be activated immediately upon arriving at a crime scene. This development allows for the recording of the initial victim contact without needing a formal setting (e.g., with camera and tripod). Since the present study shows that victims are more likely to cooperate at the scene than one or two days later, the ability to record the victim’s statement immediately may significantly increase the effectiveness of early police intervention.

Given the low clearance rate and high number of discontinued IPV investigations, it is essential for law enforcement to continue developing both technological tools and systematic follow-up mechanisms. These should not only assess the prerequisites for investigation but also document and evaluate alternative interventions – such as risk assessments, referrals to men’s support services, and counselling options for both victims and perpetrators – in cases where prosecution is not feasible. Persuading an uncooperative victim to participate can be difficult through dialogue alone. However, when the police demonstrate through action that the crime is taken seriously – by, for example, involving forensic specialists or maintaining consistent follow-up contact with the victim – it can help build trust and convey the seriousness of the offence. In autumn 2024, the Stockholm Police Region made a strategic decision to pilot an initiative involving forensic experts in cases of intimate partner violence (Polisen, 2024a). For 12 weeks in spring 2025, officers taking reports were instructed to contact the forensic coordinator when the incident involved close relationships. The aim was to increase the use of forensic resources and awareness among frontline and investigative personnel handling IPV cases.

Finally, a key distinction must be made regarding the police’s role in IPV investigations. The investigative process consists of several formal decisions – such as initiating an investigation or conducting specific measures – which are clearly structured in terms of time and responsibility. However, in IPV cases, the investigation leader is (or should be) a prosecutor. This means that key decisions – especially regarding whether an investigation should be closed – are usually made by the prosecutor. Therefore, the police’s formal role in influencing the legal outcome of a case must be seen as limited.

Given this limitation, it may be more productive for the police to focus on what they can actually control: the content and quality of the conversation with the victim, and the early preventive measures taken. Since 2004, the Swedish police have worked to improve initial crime scene responses (Polisen, 2004, 2012, 2014, 2023a, 2023c, 2024b, 2022b). However, national monthly follow-ups still primarily measure outcomes that are dependent on the prosecutor’s decisions – such as the number of cases referred for prosecution (Polisens, 2007a, 2010a, 2022e). Perhaps the conflict around prioritisation could be eased if investigative leaders were evaluated based on factors within police control – such as victim engagement, early documentation efforts, or other investigability indicators. Setting measurable goals for these actions might better align police performance with the long-term aim of reducing intimate partner violence.

7. Conclusions

This study draws one important conclusion about IPV investigations in Stockholm in Sweden: the police’s ability to investigate cases of intimate partner violence is insufficient. The main issue seems to be the conflict between the high priority given to such cases, the fact that they less often lead to prosecution, and the recommendation not to allocate resources to cases with low prosecution rates. Many investigative measures that could and should be conducted are not being carried out, likely due to these conflicting recommendations. However, it is important to notice that in IPV investigations the prosecutor is the formal decision maker in the role as investigation leader.

While the police are instructed to offer legal counsel to victims, these offers are frequently declined. Similarly, although the police are advised to video-record interviews, this is not always feasible due to limited access to appropriate equipment or the victim’s reluctance to be filmed. Given the insufficient conditions to investigate and resolve these crimes, the police must at least do what they are supposed to do when it comes to violent crimes: to offer the victim legal counsel, to increase their knowledge about what works and how victims may change their position and become willing to cooperate and finally, utilise forensic teams in larger extent when the violence is not severe. This may both increase the victim’s willingness to cooperate and improve clearance rates.

8. Limitations

The study only includes investigative measures and risk-reducing interventions (RRI) that are documented in the police investigation system. Investigative measures and RRI such as risk assessments, referring the perpetrator to support centres, and applying for restraining orders were not regularly reported in 2016–2021.