We Didn’t Win the Battle, but We Are Gonna Win the War!

How applying for funding for issues of vital importance does not necessarily end in funding but fuels future research and practice

In 2019, we were both involved in an application for funding of the development of a Critical Pandemic Response (CPR) exercise. The aim was to improve multinational preparedness, cooperation, collaboration and response to the possible spread of public health risks and test a validated exercise model. The case was a pandemic. At the last minute, we were unable to apply due to unexpected causes. Little did we know how spot on our initiative was back then with the COVID-19 outbreak in December 2019.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic tests national and international crisis preparedness to its outmost. Many countries report the lack of personnel, equipment, and guidelines to tackle the major consequences of the virus. Despite heroic efforts from healthcare-workers, communities and governments, the world is currently experiencing a crisis. A crisis is here defined as a situation that overwhelms everyday capacities and resources, and goes across administrative, organizational and geographical borders (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010). It is too soon to conclude on what could or should have been the best solutions to reducing both national and international consequences of the Corona-outbreak. However, which also is the aim of this essay; it can be, from a Risk Governance perspective, possible to point to some observed symptoms that may explain why crisis preparedness efforts are currently challenged. In the following, we share thoughts and ideas about pandemic challenges, as seen from the governance of risk, in general, as well as from multiagency efforts and policing especially.

Social

Social vulnerability is here defined as the overall response capacity of a society (Cutter et al., 2009). There is a tendency in hazard mitigation planning to often focus on physical and technological vulnerabilities. It is just as important to focus on population groups especially vulnerable due to e.g. poverty, age, disability, and socioeconomic factors (FEMA, 2020). As documented during the Corona-outbreak, the 65+ age group make up about 72 per cent of the total share of death (Worldometers, 2020). As elderly for years have been identified as especially vulnerable when crisis strikes by the WHO (2002), the high number of death tolls may indicate that targeted mitigation efforts should have been implemented at an earlier point in time.

Organizational and societal

Vulnerability of organizations is the ability organizations possess to mitigate, respond to and master existing and new threats (Norwegian National Security Authority, 2017). Examples are the development of overall strategies, plans of actions, risk assessments and development of aviation systems. The possibility of a pandemic outbreak has for years been identified as one of the international top-risk scenarios. Still, the ongoing outbreak has been described as a “black swan”. As the latter also has been contested, what remains is that predictions do not in themselves create preparedness.

Pandemic outbreaks are often overwhelming and overstrain national and international capacities and resources. The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, the first of the 21st century, proved how very quickly a new virus can spread to every corner of the globe. There are several other examples of such outbreaks, including the 2002 SARS outbreak, the 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in South Korea, and the 2014 West Africa Ebola epidemic. The last resulted in a total of 28,616 cases of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) and 11,310 deaths in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. Additionally, 36 cases and 15 deaths occurred in other countries (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). Several key international legal instruments govern pandemic management in the European Union (EU). Examples being the International Health Regulations (WHO, 2005) and Decision 1082/13 Pandemic related to cross border crisis and disasters. Still, we have during COVID-19 witnessed multiple national examples of personnel, locality and equipment shortage. In addition, there has been examples of discussion and stated confusion related to best practices and approaches. Understandably, it is difficult to fully prepare for a virus such as COVID. However, the reported under-sizing may indicate that the follow-up of identified risks has been inadequate both nationally and internationally. It should be noted that decisions have been made. Due to political and policy concerns, decisions have for instance emphasised less national and more global production and supply of different types of pandemic equipment. Crises, such as a pandemic, may act as an initiative to change. Thus, it may be that we will be witnessing a shift in this argumentation.

Human

Human vulnerabilities in this context involves the human aspects of being able to mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover from threats. Examples of human threats include a lack of understanding, inadequate training, wrongful or misuse of equipment and procedures, and human error (Norwegian National Security Authority, 2017). The last is not necessary a deliberate action but is an inherent part of being human; we err. The aim is to diminish this variable though systems that constantly remind us that our own behaviour is a risk. Despite global public advice from WHO against the Coronavirus, there is ample media coverage on individuals, even in prominent positions, that disregard or choose to act against these same advices. Human error excluded, the reasons why some chose not to follow WHO recommendations are probably several. Examples may include personal, cultural or psychological factors. On the other side, it may also be a symptom of lack of belief in expert information.

When international crises occur, they require a higher degree of cross-border coordination and collaboration (Berlin & Carlström, 2009). An example of such multinational effort was the EU response to the Ebola outbreak, which included monitoring, collective actions, and mobilization of financial, scientific, and political resources. EU expertise also helped neighbouring countries at risk and ensured crisis preparedness measures (e.g, European Mobile Laboratories). Achieving and maintaining well-functioning and effective coordination and collaboration during crisis processes is however challenging.

There exists an assumption in crisis management that crisis collaboration exercises test and develop cross-sector integration, preparedness efforts, and response (Rutty & Rutty, 2012). However, new academic research indicates that exercises tend to produce results with limited utility value in real crises (Berlin & Carlström, 2009, 2015; Kristiansen et al., 2017; Magnussen et al., 2018; Sørensen, 2017). Sources to date are conflicting as to why the utility value of collaboration exercises is limited, but cited reasons range from having to deal with bureaucratic and administrative barriers (Berlin & Carlström, 2009), to failing to prioritize utility learning (Stein, 1997). Research further indicates that having too large gaps between formal and actual organizational policies (Meyer and Rowan, 1997) affect collaboration development. Not engaging in sufficient collaboration in crises could make it harder for crisis managers to impose order (Boin & Bynander, 2015), deal with consequences (Salman Sawalha, 2014), and ensure necessary resilience, flexibility, and efficiency (Jung & Song, 2015). In the following, we describe the exercise Critical Pandemic Response (CPR) exercise.