Preventing the Use of Force Through Police Negotiation

1. Introduction

In popular culture, the police crisis and hostage negotiator is presented as someone who is brought in when it looks unlikely that the special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams will be able to resolve a situation without risk to hostagesʼ lives, and a successful negotiation ends with the hostage taker coming out with his hands over his head to surrender. This reduces negotiation to a plan B intervention, once tactical intervention has been unsuccessful, and additionally reduces the chances of success.

In Norway, the Crisis and Hostage Negotiation Unit (CHNU) is the most highly trained police unit in communication and negotiation. CHNU is a national emergency response unit with special expertise in negotiation in ʻhostage and kidnapping situations, and in other organized and serious crimeʼ (Politidirektoratet, 2011). As a national emergency response unit, CHNUʼs remit covers the entire country. CHNU is set up as a separate unit of full-time negotiators and differs from similar units in other countries in the following three aspects: its negotiators have full-time positions within it, they go out on patrol in the central parts of the capital, Oslo, and all are trained to deal with every kind of negotiation, whether involving suicidal and mentally ill people, barricades, kidnappings (both at home and abroad) or terrorism.

Having full-time positions gives CHNU negotiators much greater scope to develop their role, which is very important to the development of each individualʼs skills. As full-time negotiators, 30 per cent of their working hours is devoted to certification and skills maintenance training. The other 70 per cent is spent carrying out regular patrols in Oslo (CHNU takes part in both daytime and evening patrols), developing its methodology, and sharing its skills (with both internal and external collaborators). This means CHNU officers do plenty of ordinary police work when they have no assignments involving pure negotiation. There is always a set number of negotiators available during the night for national and international on-call emergency response.

The most important function of negotiation in policing is to avoid violent intervention (Johnson et al., 2018; Strentz, 2013). Typical responses to critical events are either negotiation or tactical response by means of force and use of marksmen (Baruch & Zarse, 2012). Negotiation has proved to be an effective and successful intervention, reducing the risk of injury and death.

This article explores the role of negotiation in police practice and discusses its potential in future policing. The research question are:

The article is organized so that the next section gives a background and a theoretical framework related to crisis and hostage negotiation, followed by an overview of the data material. In the results section, CHNUʼs philosophy, its methodology, and what it does are presented, and there is a focus on topics such as the kind of tasks it carries out, how effective it is and what they can contribute beyond surrender. Next, the status of negotiation in the Norwegian police is discussed, with the ultimate aim of discussing whether the time has come to redefine the place of negotiation in police operations.

2. Background

The Norwegian police are known for their lengthy training (in the form of a bachelorʼs degree), for being unarmed (not carrying firearms, although guns are kept locked in their vehicles), for enjoying a very high level of public trust (Thomassen, 2013; Thomassen et al., 2014), and for the high proportion of female officers (Jon, 2021). They are part of an Anglo-Saxon tradition, described by Caless and Tong (2015) as ʻcivilian policing, with a uniform that [is] distinctly unmilitary, a decentralized structure and a modicum of independence from the governing power.ʼ The philosophy is ʻpolicing by consentʼ (Reiner, 2010). The principles of ʻleast possible use of forceʼ and ʻconflict resolution via communicationʼ are strongly held (Lie & Lagestad, 2011) and are given a great degree of emphasis in police recruitment and training (Bloksgaard et al., 2020; Bloksgaard & Prieur, 2016). These police ideals can also be seen in the characteristics the Norwegian Police University College (NPUC) considers desirable in prospective police students: decisiveness and a willingness to act, combined with analytical skills and the ability to be open, inclusive, cooperative, and mature. NPUC highlights the importance of respect, integrity, empathy, good communication skills, and sound ethical standards (Politihøgskolen, 2020). Many of the same values and capabilities can be observed in other Nordic countries (Bloksgaard & Prieur, 2016; Inzunza, 2015).

As in other Western countries, negotiation became an established branch of policing in Norway following the tragic outcome of the police assault against the group holding 11 Israeli athletes hostage during the Summer Olympics in Munich in 1972 (McMains et al., 2021). Crisis and hostage negotiation was introduced into the Norwegian police in 1983–84, and in 1986 and 1991 a small number of officers were sent on a course at Hendon Police College in the UK, and subsequently for further training in negotiation in the United States and Canada. In 1993, in preparation for the 1994 Winter Olympics in Lillehammer, these officers, with the assistance of the FBIʼs Fred Lanceley, were responsible for training several more police negotiators (Røren, 2011). In the first 10 years following the introduction of trained negotiators in Norway, negotiation was a supplementary competence which some officers had, and which could be used if situations arose that required crisis and hostage negotiation. These officers had a little time set aside from their ordinary work for training and further skills development. (There is still, in some police districts, officers for whom negotiation is an additional skill alongside their normal work.)

In 2006, a negotiation group was set up in the Oslo police district and named the Crisis and Hostage Negotiation Unit (CHNU). Initially, CHNU involved part-time service, with negotiation a secondary function of officers holding other posts within the police district. In 2014, the decision was taken to strengthen CHNU by training more negotiators, and CHNU became a separate unit in the Oslo police district, with all negotiators being given full-time posts within it. This arrangement allows them to go out on routine patrol, and all are trained to deal with every kind of negotiation task. Information about the number of negotiators working in CHNU is classified, so cannot be revealed here. As with other specialist agencies in the police, CHNU was long male-dominated, but the most recent intake has raised the proportion of women, giving CHNU a gender balance of 40 per cent women and 60 per cent men.

From a policing perspective, crisis and hostage negotiation is still a young and evolving field, whose aim is to obtain the subjectʼs compliance without the use of tactical force (Johnson et al., 2018). The purpose of negotiation is to avoid violent intervention through dialogue, and the use of negotiators is considered an effective method of responding to critical incidents (Oostinga et al., 2018). Strentz (2013) defines crisis negotiation as ʻa process designed to save lives of responders, victims, civilians, and the subjectʼ and, he continues: ʻWe take time to listen so the crisis can be resolved by bringing the subject to his senses, not necessarily to his knees.ʼ The ʻappropriate use of timeʼ is highlighted by McMains et al. (2021) as one of the most valuable tools a negotiator can bring to the situation. Unlike tactical responses, which have the advantage of speed but also carry a greater risk of injury or death, negotiation is ʻa peaceful approach, with fewer injuries, less liability, and greater appeal to public relationsʼ (Baruch & Zarse, 2012).

The Behavioural Change Stairway Model (BCSM) is central in the field of negotiation, moving from active listening skills (ALS) through empathy to influence (McMains et al., 2021). The goal is to change a subjectʼs behaviour, and to achieve this, a negotiator must use ALS to facilitate empathy, which enables the development of a rapport with the subject. This, in turn, provides a basis for influence and behavioural change (Johnson et al., 2018; Vecchi et al., 2005). Empathy is a key tool and basic part of crisis negotiation, helping build a relationship, encourage trust, and defuse emotions. McMains et al. (2021) state: ʻThrough research in therapy and counselling, empathy has been established as a necessary condition to facilitate change in a person.ʼ

Active listening skills (ALS) are considered fundamental to negotiation, with McMains (2002) calling them ʻthe aspirin of negotiationsʼ. McMains et al. (2021) include the following skills: asking open-ended questions; using effective pauses and minimal encouragers; mirroring; paraphrasing; and emotional labelling. Through active listening, the negotiator can display warmth, understanding, and empathy (Bodie et al., 2015). Active listening is also demonstrated through non-verbal cues and elements such as appropriate eye contact, open body posture, and positive voice tone (Johnson et al., 2018).

All situations that negotiators have to deal with are stressful. As McMains et al. (2021) point out: ʻPhysically, adrenaline is dumped into the system and body functions are on full alert. Emotions, anxiety, and fear are elevated.ʼ For a negotiator, it is essential to be able to reduce stress in the hostage taker, by being calming and reassuring, using ALS, and being non-aggressive and non-threatening (McMains et al., 2021).

There will also be a lot of stress on the negotiator: ʻThe negotiator realizes that every word said, every action taken, and every decision made may cost livesʼ (McMains et al., 2021). The negotiatorʼs ability to deal with stress is crucial, and they need to have their stress management tools fully internalized.

To be a good negotiator requires sufficient practice for the techniques to be internalized, and training is therefore important as it ʻbridges the gap between instruction and the real worldʼ (Baruch & Zarse, 2012). There is a well-developed tradition within the negotiation field of using role play for the acquisition of and training in the necessary skills (Van Hasselt et al., 2008).

3. Methods

Ethnographic and observational studies are often used for researching police culture and organization (Manning, 2014;) and typically involve accompanying police on patrol (Dahl & Tjora, 2021). By contrast, empirical negotiation studies are often based on questionnaires or interviews (Grubb et al., 2022; Johnson et al., 2018; Oostinga et al., 2018). There has previously been scant ethnographic research because of the way negotiators were organized, but thanks to CHNUʼs being a unit, whose members have full-time negotiator positions but still go on patrol, I was able to carry out a ride-along, ethnographic and observational study¹ of them.

I followed CHNU from October 2018 to February 2020, at which point Covid-19 stopped my fieldwork. The fieldwork was most concentrated in autumn 2018 and between spring and June 2019. During these periods I often went out on patrol with CHNU officers, especially on evening and weekend shifts, and I also joined them for training days, certification, meetings, and skills-building activities. Additionally, I conducted more structured interviews. In total, the data comprises 326 hours of observation and interviews. Through observing the full breadth of CHNUʼs activities, including training and meetings where its members share their expertise with colleagues in addition to going out on patrol, I have gained good insight into CHNUʼs philosophy, its method, and the types of assignments it has. Through my involvement with CHNU I came to know all the negotiators quite well and have been on patrol with the entire unit. Being out on patrol mostly entailed ʻback-seat researchʼ (Høigård, 2011), but on some occasions, I patrolled with a single negotiator and so sat in the front passenger seat, a position described by Dahl & Tjora (2021) in relation to researchers as riding shotgun.

On patrol, I also usually accompanied the negotiators when they left the patrol car, observing their encounters with the public and how they handled situations. I followed them wherever they went – whether in the public space on the street or into private houses. For my own safety, I was occasionally asked to stay in the car and wait until the situation had been resolved. During the observation this happened twice, and none of the situations led to negotiations. Since CHNU officers often use the telephone as a work tool and call the person they want to negotiate with, I was able to listen to the negotiators speaking to them by conference call.

Studying CHNU has shown me the importance of observation as a method of gaining knowledge about the culture in the unit and for studying practice. Had the study been conducted purely as an interview survey, much core information would have been lost – partly because I would not have been able to ask key questions if I had not seen the negotiators at work, and partly because the negotiators are perhaps not fully aware of their own culture.

Field notes were made (using either a laptop or pen and paper) while the negotiation was underway, when we were back in the patrol car, or when I arrived home after the shift. When the negotiators were using the telephone, I was able to make notes in real time.

In addition to using participatory observation, I also interviewed almost all the CHNU negotiators. The number of personnel in CHNU is classified information, so the number of interviews cannot be disclosed. They took place in spring 2020 (over the telephone due to the pandemic) and lasted between 1.5 and 2.5 hours. As I knew all the interviewees well, the interviews were not, in my opinion, adversely affected by not occurring face to face. In the interviews, I was able to ask the negotiators to go more deeply into questions to which observations had not provided an answer. I was also able to explore each individual negotiatorʼs motivation, views, and experience. The interviews were recorded and later transcribed verbatim. The excerpts provided here are translations from Norwegian by the author. The data, both from fieldnotes and interviews, were encoded manually and subjected to a thematic analysis based on previous research and theory (Widerberg 2001).

4. Results

5. Discussion: Redefining the place of negotiations in police operations?

Research has shown that physical capabilities have traditionally been highly valued and readily convertible into symbolic capital such as recognition and prestige (Chan et al., 2003; Lagestad, 2012; Leirvik & Ellefsen, 2020). And earlier research has shown that, traditionally, physical capability has been valued more highly than communication skills and an explanatory approach (Hoel & Christensen, 2016; Lagestad, 2011; Loftus, 2009). It appears this is changing in Norway.

Police culture has often been described as a masculine culture valuing danger, excitement, rough methods, and the capture of thieves (Finstad, 2018). Norwegian police culture is rooted in these traditions, but is also open to change. Writing about the Norwegian police, Finstad (2018) makes it clear the police have undoubtedly changed, and that the changes in Norway are largely the same as those seen in other Western countries. She points to a better trained police force, to a reduced tolerance of discrimination and use of unnecessary force, and to the police having become a far more open institution, adding that ʻthe masculinity culture has been weakened, and breaches of the law – such as domestic violence – that formerly had low status, have moved up on the priority listʼ. Police methods too are changing, with less emphasis on physical strength and more on patience and communication skills (Bloksgaard & Prieur, 2016; Gundhus, 2005; Inzunza, 2015; Jon, 2021; Lagestad, 2011; Wathne, 2016).

As indicated in the Introduction, the principles of ʻleast possible use of forceʼ and ʻconflict resolution via communicationʼ are strongly held in Norway (Lie & Lagestad, 2011) and much emphasized in police recruitment and training (Bloksgaard et al., 2020; Bloksgaard & Prieur, 2016). Basic police training takes the form of a bachelorʼs degree from the NPUC, where great weight is placed on subjects such as communication, conflict management, and professional ethics.

Leirvik and Ellefsen (2020) show that attitudes in the police are changing, and they point to the difference between younger and older generations of police officers. Their study shows that a majority of their younger informants highlight precisely those qualities thought of as their ʻsofter skillsʼ as making them particularly suitable for patrol work; the study also shows that negotiating and communicative skills are highly valued in the workplace, in addition to physical strength.

Even though the status of communicative and explanatory-style policing in general, and of CHNU in particular, seems to be rising, the traditional understanding of how assignments should be resolved and what the negotiator can contribute remains dominant. This is apparent in the organization, among patrol officers and in written operative procedures, as in the Police Emergency Preparedness System (Politidirektoratet, 2011). In a skills-sharing situation with operational officers, CHNU officers asked the gathered police staff: ʻWhat do you think we can offer?ʼ Back came the laughing response: ʻTalk!ʼ This was followed by answers such as: ʻGet the other party to cooperate, give us advice, and take over if everything is stuck.ʼ Here, the patrol officers make it plain that they see negotiation as plan B, to take over if their own efforts have failed to resolve the situation.

Such an understanding is also seen in the Police Emergency Preparedness Systems (Politidirektoratet, 2011), where the normal order of steps taken during an armed intervention is given as follows:

As we see, negotiation comes a long way down the list – only appearing at stage five. In traditional police work, locating will mean driving to where the incident is taking place so as to observe and gain an overview of the situation. Once an overview has been formed, the aim will be to try to isolate the object of the incident and to evacuate others caught up in the situation. All of this takes time, and supposing that each of these steps takes 10 to 15 minutes, an hour could pass before the negotiators become involved. CHNUʼs tasks can in fact be carried out parallel to the other tasks carried out by other units, and because their most important tool is the telephone, they can work from a distance. Their way of working is to try to telephone the person concerned immediately, without waiting until negotiators have arrived at the scene, often establishes contact fast. And with that, immediate observation follows, providing information about what is happening at the scene long before the officers physically arrive there. But because the negotiation stage is so far down the list and is seen as a strategy only when ʻthings have become stuckʼ, the opportunity for swift resolution is lost.

The most important argument for changing police culture towards considering negotiation as an early intervention is, of course, that negotiation is a peaceful police intervention that can ʻresult in an increased likelihood of successful peaceful resolutionʼ (Grubb et al., 2018). Negotiation is a conspicuously preventative method that uses communication to resolve deadlocks in the most appropriate and justifiable way possible.

In Norway, crime prevention is defined as the policeʼs primary strategy (Politidirektoratet, 2020), and great emphasis is placed on police methods that prevent criminality, avoid the unnecessary use of force, and maintain public trust in the police. Negotiation is a preventative method that, in crisis situations, can have both a risk-reducing and an injury-preventing effect by avoiding the use of force. By negotiating and spending time establishing relationships, CHNU concludes most of its engagements without using physical force. Attempting to resolve a situation by using negotiation as a first step fulfils the aim of prevention as the primary strategy. Additionally, negotiation is effective, giving good results. The fact that only 13 per cent of those cases where negotiation takes place end in tactical intervention shows that it genuinely prevents the drama of tactical intervention and that it does indeed avoid potentially violent interventions. As Grubb et al. (2018) put it, negotiation can ʻplay a role in whether individuals live or dieʼ.

6. Concluding remarks

The traditional understanding in Norway of what constitutes ʻreal police workʼ is changing, and communication and conflict management now enjoy a much higher standing in police work generally than they did some decades ago. Negotiation as a field represents a refinement of communication work in the police, and its most important function is to prevent violent intervention. I therefore join with Grubb et al. (2019) who write:

Without HCNs [hostage and crisis negotiators], there is no doubt that many individuals would die, or be seriously injured. On this basis, it is commonsensical to suggest that the role should be given more credence within the policing arena and HCNs should be credited more highly for the work that they do.

It is at the sharpest end of the policeʼs negotiation work/organization that the Crisis and Hostage Negotiation Unit (CHNU) is to be found. The way this unit is organized in Norway, with its full-time negotiators also doing ordinary police work out on patrol and being trained to deal with every kind of negotiation assignment, has resulted in a highly expert and successful negotiation team. The Norwegian CHNU has refined the art of negotiation, and police work itself, to such a degree that the Norwegian police ought to review the way operational work has traditionally been carried out. Negotiation should become part of the operational gold standard much earlier and be used more often as the first line of action during the mobilization of police resources. Negotiation is a way to avoid violent intervention, but it can do much more than simply deliver total surrender, as this study of the Norwegian CHNU has shown. The decision support, sensor support, and effector support that the negotiators are able to contribute often means that a tactical intervention can be carried out with even greater certainty, thereby lowering the risk of serious injury. The time has come to elevate crisis and hostage negotiation from being plan B, when everything has become deadlocked, to being an active part of the operational solution.